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]]]]]]]]]]]]]]] SECOND REPLY TO MR. GAEDE [[[[[[[[[[[[[[
on the Subject of Abortion (10/4/1989)
by Oleg Panczenko
26 September 1989
REPLY I.1: Under Objectivist philosophy, abortion is not murder.
I.1.1 I agreed that, under Ayn Rand's philosopy of Objectivism,
eabortion is not murder.
I.1.2 However, Objectivism is deficient as a system of
philosophy because it is insufficiently grounded in a general
framework. Too many proposals are asserted rather than sustained
analytically. For an account of the deficiencies in knowledge of
philosophy by members of the Rand Cult see Rothbard.
I.1.3 Rand's epistemology is authoritarian in that knowledge can
be certain and known to be absolutely true, in contrast to the
skeptical rationalism of Hume-Popper-Hayek.
I.1.4 The use of reason cannot be justified by reason.
I.1.5 I agree with Hume that reason alone cannot provide us with
a system of normative ethics.
I.1.6 ``The whole political point of the Humean (and indeed
Hayekian) critique of the role of reason in human affairs is
precisely that it is more likely to be used for authoritarian
ends than libertarian ones.'' (Barry, p. 131)
I.1.7 Rand is wrong when she says that freedom in necessary for
human survival. The survival-value of freedom depends on
circumstances.
I.1.8 Consider primitive men: their lives are governed by myth,
rigid codes of behavior, ceremony and all encompassing religions.
The precepts for survival, unarticulated and even unknown, are
embodied in what some would dismiss as `superstition'. Such
restrictions on individual autonomy are necessary to assure
survival because primitive man lives on the brink of extinction.
The cost of experimentation is too often death, and there are not
so many men that they can be expended. The importance of the
individual to the survival of the group is too great to allow him
to be free.
1.I.9 Capitalism makes greater freedom both possible and
necessary. For in an industrialized capitalist society the
consequences of failure are diminished: we have insurance, a
surplus of material goods and rapid transportation, so that goods
may be transported from regions of plenty to regions of want.
Our science and technology, along with our empirical approach,
allows us to greatly reduce the uncertainties of the consequences
of our action.
I.1.10 Freedom becomes necessary because we are less certain of
what the best survival strategy is as society grows ever more
complex. We should tolerate experimentation by individuals
(though intolerance has its place). People then adapt what is
successful.
REPLY: I.2. On Fallacious arguments and ``A is A''.
I.2.1 The law of identity, stated in the formulation due to
Leibniz (1646-1716), is `A is A'. In modern notation it may be
written x = x. The law of identity may be understood in a
semantic sense as stating that a term must preserve the same
denotation throughout any given context. I gave it as an example
of an assertion which seems obviously and irrefutably true, yet
which has been picked at by philosophers. The question of how
things that vary with time can be identical with themselves dates
back at least to the time of Heraclitus (c.535-c.475 B.C.). His
assertion that one cannot step in the same river twice (for the
water flows) is well known. Here are a few remarks from
Wittgenstein (1889-1951):
``3.323 ... (In the proposition ``Green is green'' --
where the first word is a proper name and the last an
adjective -- these words have not merely different
meanings but they are different symbols.)''
(Wittgenstein)
``4.243 ... Expressions like ``a = a'', or expressions
deduced from these are neither elementary propositions
nor otherwise significant signs. (Wittgenstein)
``5.5303 ... [T]o say of two things that they are
identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it
is identical with itself is to say nothing.''
(Wittgenstein)
``5.534 ...[W]e see that apparent propositions like:
``a = a'' ... cannot be written in a correct logical
notation at all.'' (Wittgenstein)
I refer interested readers to Edwards, Encyclopedia and Quine,
Methods of Logic, though there are many books on philosophy and
logic which cover the idea of `identity'.
I.2.2 ``Stolen Concept'' is a Randian term. It means using a
concept while denying the antecedent concepts on which it
(logically) depends. One must use care in classifying an
argument as suffering from the fallacy of `Stolen Concept',
because practical questions cannot be reduced to syllogistic
exercises. It is quite possible to reach the same conclusions
using different lines of argument. There is no logical
inconsistency in holding conclusion B, which is identical with
conclusion A, while rejecting arguments B1, B2, ... Bn, because
one is using arguments A1, A2, ... An.
I.2.3 Certainly one can criticize of Kant's classification of
axioms into analytic (``true by virtue of the meanings of the
words used to formulate them'', Scruton, History, p. 139) and
synthetic (``saying something about the empirical world'',
Scruton, History, p. 139). The American philosopher W.V.O. Quine
has attacked the distinction (Quine, View), and there are
philosophers who argue that the laws of logic have some empirical
reference. But this is not grounds to call the `analytic-
synthetic' classification a fallacy. Kant's classification is
considered a fallacy by Ayn Rand and Objectivists, who hold that
objective reality is absolutely knowable by human intelligence
(as contrasted with, for example, the skeptical rationalists such
as Hume, Popper and Hayek), but at best it is premature to
consider it so.
REPLY I.3: `Will to death' not characteristic of collectivists.
I.3.1 The ``will to death'' is not characteristic of
collectivists generally. I define `collectivists' to mean those
who put the good of the group before the good of the individual
(clearly there are limits, for the group is composed of
individuals), and by `sacrifice' I mean coercing or forcing an
individual to do something which benefits the group at some cost
to himself. Suppose we measure the goodness of a survival
strategy of a group by the degree of proliferation of its
members. Suppose that groups which `sacrifice' certain of their
members proliferate more than those that do not. Clearly, in
this hypothetical case, `collectivism' is a manifestation of the
``will to life''. One can argue that a willingness to
`sacrifice' for the group, i.e. `altruistic' behavior, is an
inborn mechanism to assure the survival of the group (species).
In any case, collectivism does not logically presuppose a ``will
to death''.
REPLY I.4: Social context.
I.4.1 The disagreement here is due to different senses of the
word `social'. One may exist within a social context without
necessarily having any social interaction. A prisoner in
solitary confinement has no systematic interaction with others
(i.e., social interaction), but the fact of his imprisonment is
due to the existence of a social context! It is clear that
though the fetus itself is incapable of social interaction, it
can provoke a great deal of social interaction by others!
I.4.2 If the fetus has a right to life then it can be prevented
from exercising it. In any case, the possession of rights is
contingent neither on the ability to exercise those rights, nor
for a need or use for those rights. A natural-rights philosopher
would argue that human beings possess certain rights by nature.
Hence human beings possess rights even if they are comatose,
senile, asleep, or in any other state where they cannot act
volitionally. A human being would still possess rights even if
he were the only one in the universe.
I.4.3 In any case, as soon as the abortionist's tool penetrated
the womb, a social context would be established, thus endowing
the fetus with rights and making any procedure which resulted in
its death a crime.
REPLY I.5: Use of `Kiss-of-death'.
I.5.1 There is an implicit ``Kiss-of death'' element in Mr
Gaede's arguments. He associates opposition to abortion with
strongly religious people. Since he considers the religious to
be highly irrational, one can infer that he considers the held
belief that abortion is wrong to be irrational as well.
REPLY I.6: Abortion is an impermissible use of force.
I.6.1 According to Rand, ``[F]orce may be used only in
retaliation and only against those who initiate its use.''
(Rand, s.v. Self-Defense)
I.6.2 The fetus is a being utterly devoid of volition. It
cannot initiate anything. It came into being solely because of
the willful, volitional acts of its biological parents. If it is
even a minimally rights-bearing entity then any use of force
against it is impermissible. Abortion, which by definition
entails the death of the fetus, is thus an impermissible use of
force.
I.6.3 Further, from the Principle of Nonaggression we derive
one's obligation to provide for the care of those whom he has put
in a state of helplessness through either his direct actions or
the foreseeable consequences of his indirect actions.
I.6.4 By its nature a `duty' is something which can't be
discarded or passed off. It is inalienable (non-transferable). A
slave is chattel, an article of personal, movable property. Duty
is not slavery, though one may be a slave to duty, and it is
possible to use `duty' to reduce a man to little better than a
slave. Deontology is the branch of philosophy which concerns
itself with ideas of duty and obligation. The word `slavery', as
used by Mr Gaede, is Randian jargon.
I.6.5 A mother walks her colicky baby at three in the morning
because of her duty to it. She does not do it for happiness
(defined by Rand as a ``state of non-contradictory joy'') or
pleasure.
I.6.6 Suppose the following: You are standing by a swimming
pool. Next to your foot is a switch which, when stepped on,
triggers an automatic life-saving device. A man is drowning, and
you are the only one nearby. I would argue that you have both a
legal and a moral duty to step on the switch. I do not see how
this makes you a `slave'. Granted there are degrees of and kinds
of `duty', and that there are many arguments about what `duty'
entails. But the members of a civilized society must accept some
notion of `duty' if their society is to survive.
REPLY I.7. Artificial Wombs no solution.
I.7.1 `Babies' do not go into artificial wombs; fetuses do. If
the fetus has no rights, removing it from the artificial womb and
discarding it cannot be murder. Only rights-bearing entities
can be murdered (rights-bearing is a necessary but not sufficient
condition). If the fetus has no rights, killing it either inside
or outside of the womb is of no import.
I.7.2 Suppose the following: Fetuses can be removed unharmed
from a mother's womb. A hospital has a policy of assuming all
costs associated with removing and caring for an unwanted fetus.
A mother refuses to allow her removed fetus to be placed in an
artificial womb. Indeed, she insists that it be thrown away with
the excised cancers and amputated limbs. What should the
hospital do? Does the mother have a say over the disposition of
her fetus when it is inside her, but not when it is removed?
REPLY I.8: Influence of the Roman Catholic Church good and bad.
I.8.1 I ask Mr Gaede to cite any authoritative historic
pronouncement from the Church opposing the use of anesthetics.
I.8.2 The influence of the Church has been both good and bad.
From it we get the doctrine of natural law, the idea of limited
government, the idea of the inviolable rights of the individual,
and ideas of just wars and just conduct of wars. Our written
inheritance from Greece and Rome comes to us only through copies
made by Catholic scribes. The originals have disintegrated long
ago. Hayek states that
``[E]ven agnostics ought to be grateful to the
religious traditions which, for reasons they cannot
accept, have preserved long enough those nonrational
beliefs that made available the building elements of
the extended order which we call civilization.''
(Hayek, p. 322)
I.8.3 The Church was also responsible for the Inquisition,
though that was in part a reaction against Revolutionary
messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe (see Cohn). And,
particularly after the Galileo affair, the Church took a turn
towards rigidity in matters of orthodoxy. But this was also
partly a reaction against the Reformation (see Finocchiaro's
introductory essay in Galileo).
I.8.4 In any case, the Church of the 12th century is different
from the Church of the 16th Century which is different from the
Church of the early 20th century which is different from the
Church of the late 20th century. Given such great variation in
dogmatic outlook, prediction of the Church's teachings is not as
straightforward as one would suppose.
REPLY I.9: Hidden agendas.
I.9.1 There is no hidden agenda. The religious argument against
abortion is clear: No one can force you to become pregnant. But
if you do become pregnant you have the duty to see the pregnancy
to term and to raise the child. This duty is one of piety
(non-contractual, non-voluntary obligation). Further, this
obligation also exists because the being you conceive is an
innocent human life, and it is impermissible to take innocent
life. (This is a deliberately simplified summary.)
I.9.2 You may disagree with this line of argument, but there is
nothing `hidden' about it.
REPLY I.10: Soundness of analogy of robbers/ex-robbers.
I.10.1 The point of the analogy is this: if an act is
impermissible, the convenience or happiness of those who want to
perform the act cannot be a matter of consideration.
REPLY I.11: No disagreement.
REPLY I.12: Socialism Promoted by the Roman Catholic Church.
The world's greatest socialist economies are under the rule of
atheists.
II. `Libertarians for Life' and other matters.
II.1 Doris Gordon argues from a natural rights perspective.
Natural rights are ``rights which belong to all human beings by
nature, and independently of positive law [law `posited', or laid
down]'' (Scruton, Dictionary).
II.2 Mr Gaede holds that `rights are acquired at birth' (i.e.
`social context') and that they are ``activated by human social,
volitional, rational, acting, nature.'' But a baby cannot
acquire rights, for `acquisition' implies effort, and a nenonate
is incapable of effort (presumably it must do more than cry for
its rights). Hence a baby's rights are either bestowed by a
rights-granting authority or are inherent. But we reject the
idea of a rights-granting authority (God or the State). Hence if
the baby is a rights-bearing entity after its birth (true by
hypothesis) it must be a rights-bearing entity before its birth.
As to the assertion that the baby's rights are `activated' by its
birth: What can be activated must be latent, implying that the
baby has some sort of inherent rights. Is the right to have
rights activated by birth? Yet this itself is a right.
II.3 A newborn baby does have the right to be a nuclear
physicist, for the possession of a right and the ability to
exercise it are not predicated on each other. As soon as a baby
becomes a citizen (say after the moment of birth), it possesses
the right of Free Speech, as defined by the Government and Courts
of the United Sates. Clearly it has no ability to exercise that
right.
II.4 Mr Gaede establishes a false distinction between the right
to abortion and the right to kill. By definition abortion is
``[a]ny fatally premature expulsion of an embryo or fetus from
the womb.'' (American Heritage Dictionary, s.v. abortion). Hence
abortion is killing. It is a very crude method of birth control.
II.5 Ayn Rand states that ``[a] child cannot acquire any rights
until it is born''. Mr Gaed claims that a mother carrying a
child does not have the right to knowingly consume teratogenic
substances because ``[t]he unborn are entitled to an implication
of rights.'' Entitlement establishes a right. The entitlement to
an implication of rights is a right. Hence the unborn have
rights, contradicting the proposition that the fetus has no
rights. Secondly, if the unborn have no rights then it is no
crime for the mother to do whatever she wishes to her unborn
child. She cannot be punished after the birth of the child, when
it become a rights-bearing entity, for what she did to the child
before it was a rights-bearing entity.
II.6 I agree that there is nothing inherently sacred about human
life and that ``rights are epistemological constructs and have no
metaphysical existence even though they refer to human nature''.
II.7 Human life has value only because we give it value. The
question of abortion will not be resolved by argument or reason
but by a shift of the popular Weltanschauung one way or the
other.
Bibliography
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York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.
Chapter 7 is devoted to ``Ayn Rand and Egoism''.
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s.v. Identity.
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Hayek, Friedrich A. The Essence of Hayek. Edited by Chiaki
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Quine, Willard Van Orman. From a Logical Point of View, 2nd
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See ``Two Dogmas of Empiricism'', pp. 20-46 for a criticism of
the analytic-synthetic distinction.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Methods of Logic, 3rd Edition. New
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by Harry Binswanger. New York: New American Library, 1986.
Dr. Binswanger, who was an associate of Ayn Rand, holds a
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Rothbard, Murray N. ``My Break With Branden and the Ayn Rand
Cult''. Liberty 3(1), 27-32 (September 1989).
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of Modern Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.
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Hill and Wang, 1982.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated
by C.K. Ogden. 1922. Reprint. New York and London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1988.
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